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Abstract
The threat status and criminal collaborations of potential terrorists
are hidden but give rise to observable behaviours and communications.
Terrorists, when acting in concert, need to communicate to organise their
plots. The authorities utilise such observable behaviour and communi-
cation data to inform their investigations and policing. We present a
dynamic latent network model that integrates real-time communications
data with prior knowledge on individuals. This model estimates and pre-
dicts the latent strength of criminal collaboration between individuals
to assist in the identification of potential cells and the measurement of
their threat levels. We demonstrate how, by assuming certain plausi-
ble conditional independences across the measurements associated with
this population, the network model can be combined with models of in-
dividual suspects to provide fast transparent algorithms to predict group
attacks. The methods are illustrated using a simulated example involving
the threat posed by a cell suspected of plotting an attack.
Keywords: chain event graphs, dynamic non-Gaussian models, Markov pro-
cesses, probabilistic graphical models, terrorist networks, statistical network
models, decision support systems
1 Introduction
In Bunnin and Smith (2019) we showed how to build a Bayesian dynamic model
that could help police monitor and frustrate lone criminals in perpetrating acts
of violence against the general public. However it is well known that such crimi-
nals often act in gangs that co-ordinate themselves so as to present a much more
severe threat. Performing this multivariate extension of the above technologies
is far from straightforward. It requires bespoke graphically supported proba-
bilistic models of teams of criminals over a given population cooperating in a way
that leads to an attack cell. This type of model then needs to be combined in a
coherent way with models we have of the individuals within that population. In
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this paper we develop a new class of models that is able to do this. The system
is flexible enough to implement change-points, and interventions to the system
in real time. Furthermore as far as is possible our inferences are driven by closed
form recurrences meaning that the method computes forecasts quickly in real
time and its inference is scalable to much larger networks. The class of models
we propose here is to our knowledge entirely new. The proposed methodology
provides as outputs various evocative graphs and figures that communicate the
outputs of the model to give real time decision support to the Bayesian deci-
sion maker. The methodology and these outputs are illustrated in simulated
example based on real domain information.
1.0.1 Background and context
Identification and disruption of the activities of terrorist networks is a prime
objective of police and security services (Allen and Dempsey, 2018; Europol,
2018). This comes with several challenges: terrorists usually hide or disguise
their intentions and activities; personal communications are private and are
often encrypted, and the numbers and powers of the policing authorities are
rightly limited in democratic societies. However, terrorists do need to perform
certain activities and to communicate in order to organise and execute attacks.
These activities and communications give rise to observable data that in con-
junction with domain knowledge can be used to construct statistical models to
aid prevention and disruption of attacks.
Under current legislation, when justified and after due legal process, polic-
ing authorities can monitor the activities and intercept the communications of
individuals in order to protect public safety (Investigatory Powers Act. (c.25),
2016). Every week hundreds of new leads arise in the form of partial and frag-
mentary information (Anderson, 2016). Investigating bodies must decide how
to use the limited resources available to them to prioritise and de-prioritise cases
according to the regularly incoming noisy leads (BBC, 2019).
Bunnin and Smith (2019) presented a Bayesian hierarchical model for the
progression of an individual terrorist suspect’s threat status based on streaming
data, hereafter called the Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (RVE)
model. In this paper we present a Bayesian methodology to integrate knowledge
on individual suspects and incoming real-time leads into a dynamic weighted
network model. The weights of this network model are informed by an under-
lying dynamic steady model. We call this methodology the criminal collabo-
ration model. Each such network is composed of individuals1 as vertices. An
edge between two individuals indicates a potential conspiratorial link between
them. The weight on the edge is a statistical distribution indicating the strength
of this link. Such links between individuals are informative of potential joint
attacks. Additionally, we demonstrate how an integrated decision support
system can be obtained by combining the dynamic network data with the RVE
models of the members of the terrorist population under consideration. This
1persons of intelligence interest
2
allows us to then define suitable cell-based threat measures to estimate the
cells’ current and future threat distributions by considering the threat posed by
the members of the cell, and the activities of the cell as a whole.
Thus we present a network methodology that is customised to the prevention
of terrorist attacks through the use of domain knowledge and data available to
the counter-terrorism authorities. Note that it is essential in this domain that
whatever methodology we choose to use is simple, explainable, interpretable
and can be used with real-time data. This allows the model to be adapted as
needed and also ensures transparency in its workings given the sensitive nature
of this domain.
1.0.2 Related research
The structure, scope, dynamics and intent of such criminal networks can be
very diverse, and using statistical network methods to analyse these is a very
active area of research (Krebs, 2002; Morselli, 2009; Helfstein and Wright, 2011;
Berlusconi et al., 2016; Remmers, 2019). The formal use of network data for
intelligence use has a long history going back to at least World War II when
“Traffic Analysis”2 was used by the allied forces (Meter, 2002; Cunningham
et al., 2015).
In the context of academic terrorism research, network modelling was origi-
nally assessed by Sparrow (1991). Sparrow considered the utility of various net-
work centrality concepts applied to criminal intelligence including betweeness,
point strength, and business. Since then the social network aspects of terror-
ist networks have been researched extensively utilising diverse methods. These
include centrality measures to identify key individuals and heterogeneous roles
(Toth et al., 2013), Bayesian bipartite graph methods to identify overlapping
cells (Ranciati et al., 2017), multipartite graph methods to cluster similar ter-
rorist groups (Campedelli et al., 2019), and dynamic line graphs to visualise the
temporal dynamics of terrorist actors in covert actions and events (Broccatelli
et al., 2016).
The existing terrorist network research, however, does not focus on the types
of real-time data that the authorities have access to. Nor does it utilise the for-
mal structure of stochastic processes that we assume for the underlying trajecto-
ries of the individual suspects and their collaboration levels. Thus we believe our
contribution to this field is both novel and of utility to the policing authorities.
1.0.3 Model requirements
It is essential that our model is dynamic and supports an open population.
Firstly, individuals enter (immigration) and leave (emigration) the pool of mon-
itored suspected criminals at each time point. Immigration is through new leads
2A 1948 US Army manual defines Traffic Analysis as “the study of the external charac-
teristics of signal communications” and states that it is used for “drawing deductions and
inferences of value as intelligence even in the absence of specific knowledge of the contents of
the message” (US Department of the Army, 1948).
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that have passed a triage process3. Emigration may occur due to various rea-
sons. These include death, arrest, evidence of innocence, physical movement to
leave the jurisdiction of the authorities, or de-prioritisation based on evidence
and case load. In network terminology these are node additions and deletions.
Secondly, to capture the changing strengths of the conspiratorial link between
individuals, it is also essential that the edge weights in our model are dynamic
and responsive to evidence.
Other important features of a criminal network model noted by Sparrow
(1991) are incompleteness, fuzzy boundaries and the importance of weak ties.
Individuals will, often successfully, hide their existence, behaviour and commu-
nications. In statistical network terminology, nodes and edges will be missing
not at random (Rubin, 1976). Within this context of incomplete knowledge and
uncertainty, the fluidity of the processes and the necessity for external often
surprising information to be accommodated into the description of the process
makes the adoption of Bayesian methodologies attractive if not essential.
1.0.4 Model overview
Our Bayesian criminal collaboration model was designed keeping these require-
ments in mind. A high-level structural representation of the model is given in
Figure 1 (see Section 3 for details).
Figure 1: Overview of the criminal collaboration model.
Existing information and incoming real-time observations data collected
3See Section 3.1 for details.
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from various information channels such as direct monitoring, information ob-
tained from other agencies or informants, and financial transactions are used
to identify the pool of individuals monitored at time t. This data determines
which edges should be added to the network from time t − 1 to indicate new
connections. The strength of the conspiratorial link on the edges of the net-
work are estimated using a steady model. The steady model can be graphically
depicted by a compact dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) as shown in Figure 1.
We find that a Bayesian conjugate Gamma-Poisson steady model works well
for our application and facilitates real-time implementation across a potentially
very large number of connections. Note that other distributions can be used if
appropriate for the specific application (West and Harrison, 1997; Smith, 1979,
1981). The criminal collaboration model at time t is then combined with the
individual RVE models of the members of the monitored suspected criminals
pool at time t. Under a set of assumptions, we can then utilise this integrated
decision support system (IDSS) to obtain a cell-based threat measure for a
group of individuals suspected to be working together within a criminal cell.
The Bayesian paradigm provides the ideal framework for composing two dy-
namic models of different aspects of a process into a single coherent composite
combining together.
Thus, in contrast to the majority of existing terrorist network research:
i) we have a formal stochastic model for the threat state of individuals in-
formed by a Bayesian hierarchical model linking states, tasks and data;
these form the nodes of the network;
ii) our population is conceptually defined by concrete periodic policing deci-
sions; these define the open population immigration and emigration;
iii) ties between individuals are modelled by latent conspiratorial links in-
formed by observable data and prior information; these form the edges of
the network;
iv) we utilise a Bayesian paradigm to combine individual processes and the
multivariate network process;
v) our focus is on predicting and disrupting real-time terrorist activity.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the individual RVE
model introduced in Bunnin and Smith (2019) which provides context for our
collaboration model presented in Section 3. Section 3 further demonstrates
how a conjugate Gamma-Poisson steady model can be used to estimate the
latent conspiratorial links which form the edge weights in the networks of the
collaboration model. In Section 4 we show how the collaboration model and the
individual RVEs can be combined to create an IDSS. Further, we demonstrate
how the IDSS can be used to create suitable cell-level threat measures which
can aid in prioritising and de-prioritising cases. In Section 5 we present the
deployment of the model to simulated data informed by real cases in the public
domain, and we conclude with a discussion of the results and future work in
Section 6.
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2 The individual RVE model
The individual RVE model developed in Bunnin and Smith (2019) hypothesised
for a potential criminal the probabilistic relationship at time t between:
• The latent threat state Wt ∈ {w0 . . . wk} of a potential criminal;
• Normally hidden tasks θt = {θ1t, . . . , θdt} that the criminal may be en-
gaged in to carry out a certain plot;
• Observable data Y t resulting from task engagement.
The Bayesian hierarchical RVE model uses as input the observable noisy
data to output a vector pit = {pi1t, . . . , pikt} where piit indicates the probability
of the suspect being in threat state wi at time t. At the deepest level of the
hierarchy, a graphical model called the Reduced Dynamic Chain Event Graph
(RDCEG) is used to model the threat states (Smith and Shenvi, 2018; Shenvi
and Smith, 2019). In this application the RDCEG can be represented as a
finite state semi-Markov process. For each criminal plot, we can identify a set
of tasks which are indicative of the progression of the suspect’s efforts towards
enacting the plot. The vector θt lies in the middle layer of the RVE hierarchical
model and provides indicators of which of these tasks the suspect is engaging
in at time t. The observed data Y t is transformed into a Rd-valued signal Z t
which indicates the intensities with which the various tasks are being carried
out at time t. The jth component of Z t uses the relevant subset of the data
Y t to produce the task intensity for task θjt. An example of the threat state
space, tasks and observable variables for a vehicle, knife, gun or bomb attack
is provided in Table 4 in Appendix C of the supplementary material (Bunnin
et al., 2020).
Consider an RVE model of a lone attacker. A general template for such an
attack is described by the graph of the RDCEG in Figure 2. The state space of
this model is represented by the vertices of this graph and the edges represent
the possible transitions between the states.
ActiveConvert
Training Preparing
Neutral
Mobilised
Figure 2: RDCEG graph of an RVE model of a lone attacker
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M0 Neutral ActiveConvert Training Preparing Mobilised
N 0 0 0 0 0
A ma,n 0 ma,t ma,p 0
T mt,n 0 0 mt,p 0
P mp,n 0 0 0 mp,m
M mm,n 0 0 mm,p 0
M(t, t′) Neutral ActiveConvert Training Preparing Mobilised
N 1 0 0 0 0
A ζa(t, t′)ma,n 1− ζa(t, t′) ζa(t, t′)ma,t ζa(t, t′)ma,p 0
T ζt(t, t′)mt,n 0 1− ζt(t, t′) ζt(t, t′)mt,p 0
P ζp(t, t′)mp,n 0 0 1− ζp(t, t′) ζp(t, t′)mp,m
M ζm(t, t′)mm,n 0 0 ζm(t, t′)mm,p 1− ζm(t, t′)
Table 1: The two matrices show the semi-Markov transition matrix M(t, t′) and the transition
matrix M0 of its embedded Markov chain.
The Neutral state, w0, is the sole absorbing state that, by definition, can
be reached from any other state and is thus usually not depicted in the graph
of the RDCEG (see Shenvi and Smith (2019) for details of an RDCEG model).
Intuitively, we can think of the Neutral state not being essential to depict as a
transition to the neutral state indicated de-prioritisation of this individual’s case.
The parameters associated with the Neutral state can, if needed, be estimated
from the underlying statistical model. The remaining states {wi}4i=1 are labelled
as {ActiveConvert,Training,Preparing,Mobilised}. These non-absorbing
states are known as the positions of the RDCEG.
The prior state probabilities, the edge probabilities and the holding time
distributions are constructed from expert judgement. The format of the latter
two are shown in Table 1. Matrix M0 contains the edge probabilities pij , i.e. the
probabilities of moving from state i to state j given a transition has occurred.
Matrix M(t, t′) is the full transition matrix which is the product of the edge
probability and the state dependent holding time distribution ζ for a small time
interval (t, t′).
The position probabilities are updated using the following recurrence:
p(Wt = wi|Z t−1) =
∑
wj
p(Wt−1 = wj |Z t−1)Mj,i(t− 1, t,M0, ζ) (1)
p(Wt = wi|Z t) ∝ p(Wt = wi|Z t−1)×
∑
θ∈θt
p(Z t|θ)p(θ|Wt = wi) (2)
Equation (1) updates the posterior at time t− 1 to the prior at time t through
the semi-Markov transition matrix. Equation (2) updates the prior at time t to
the posterior at time t once the signal Z t is inferred from the observed data Y t.
Inference works from observable data through task intensities to combine with
the task likelihoods and the predefined probabilities of tasks given states. The
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recurrences thus allow periodic updating of the posterior state probabilities at
each time t. Moreover direct intelligence gained that a suspect is engaging in
a certain task can override the indirect information from Y t and hence sharpen
inference on state Wt. A simple measure of threat is given by the log odds score
of each position at time t defined as ρit = log
p(Wt=wi|Z t)
p(Wt=w0|Z t) for i = 1 . . . 4.
3 The criminal collaboration model
In the previous section, we reviewed the Bayesian hierarchical RVE model which
can be used to model a suspected lone attacker’s progression to commit a cer-
tain crime. The focus in this paper is on modelling individuals who might be
working in concert to commit a crime together. We describe our criminal
collaboration model below.
3.1 The open population
Let Ω∗t be the open population of Persons of Interest (POIs) at time t. Let
Ωt ⊆ Ω∗t be the subset of individuals that the authorities have decided to in-
vestigate and monitor at time t. For concreteness the size of Ωt may be in the
hundreds and Ω∗t in the thousands (Doward, 2020; Sabbagh, 2020; Anderson,
2016). During each time period, new leads are discovered. New investigative
cases are opened for those that pass a triage process meeting defined criteria4.
The triage process thus gives rise to a set of newly identified individuals5 Ω+t
who join the set Ωt. Over the same period, a set Ω
−
t are lost from Ωt for a
variety of reasons as discussed in Section 1. For simplicity, assume that Ω+t join
the set Ωt at the start of the time period t and existing individuals Ω
−
t are lost
at the end of t. Thus we have
Ωt = {Ωt−1\Ω−t−1} ∪ Ω+t .
We represent the conspiratorial link between individuals ωi, ωj ∈ Ωt at time
t by the random variable φijt. Notice that this conspiratorial link is a latent
variable and cannot be directly observed. We infer it from the observable be-
haviours, communications data and personal information of the individuals.
Denote by Φt the symmetric conspiracy matrix at time t with elements φijt.
Here set φiit = 0, for all ωi ∈ Ωt.
4These criteria include i) Risk: is there any evidence of risk in intelligible form, ii) Credi-
bility: is the information reliable; iii) Actionable: can anything actually be done about it; iv)
and Proportionality: is investigation of the lead necessary and proportionate within legal and
statutory obligations, resources and priorities (London, 2019; BBC, 2019).
5This is a simplification as a subset of these individuals may already be known individuals
in other contexts; moreover a lead may consist of information such as anonymous online posts
that do not directly link to any known person. However ultimately any lead or case is aimed
at discovering an individual or group of individuals that plan a crime and it is in this sense
that we talk of “individuals” (London, 2019).
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3.2 Prior knowledge and data
Collaboration between individuals gives rise to observable data of various kinds.
It is generally difficult to unpick whether each observable action is criminal or
benign. However, a collection of observations when used in conjunction with
personal information on the individuals, can be indicative of the criminality of
these behaviours and communications. There are at least six types of potentially
knowable or observable data:
• Existing kinship or social links;
• Work or other shared affiliations;
• Bilateral electronic communications (telephone, email, Whatsapp etc);
• Broadcast electronic communications (e.g. conference versions of the above,
facebook, twitter etc);
• Physical meetings (observed directly or through closed circuit television);
• Financial transactions (e.g. bank transfers between accounts).
The first two items are relatively static whereas the last four are more dynamic.
Moreover the first two are not caused by criminal collaboration, but may enable
a pre-existing tie that facilitates collaboration once other factors have come into
play. Examples of these ties are the school and social ties that existed between
several of the Al-Qaeda September 11, 2001 terrorists (Krebs, 2002), the kinship
tie between Saleem and Hashem Abedi, the former being the suicide bomber
of the May 22, 2017 Manchester Arena bombing (BBC, 2020), the latter his
brother who was found guilty of aiding Saleem (Parveen and Walker, 2020),
and the community ties surveyed by the US army in Thailand villages in 1965
(Meter, 2002).
Policing authorities typically receive information from multiple channels.
Some example channels are the monitoring of physical meetings, interception of
electronic communications, and intelligence obtained from other policing agen-
cies, covert informants, or the public. Suppose that there are m such informa-
tion channels. Denote by sijkt a summary measure of the information observed
between individuals ωi, ωj ∈ Ωt from channel k at time t. This summary mea-
sure can take a variety of forms depending on the type of information such as
a sum of the observations (e.g. duration of phone calls) or a first-order dif-
ference (e.g. increase or decrease in money exchanged from one time to the
next). Denote by Ut the observations matrix at time t with elements uijt such
that uijt = {sij1t, . . . , sijmt}. Notice that Ut is also a symmetric matrix with
uijt = ujit. Note that we use the convention that uijt is an m-dimensional zero
vector whenever i = j and whenever no information is observed between two in-
dividuals. To indicate the difference in the quality of information obtained from
the different channels, we define a parameter ξk, k = 1, . . . ,m which denotes the
relative efficiency of the intelligence obtained from channel k.
Finally, we note that it is important to differentiate two types of data associ-
ated with communications: the content of such communications and “secondary
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data”, i.e. metadata such as the identities of parties and the timing, location
and duration of communications. Often secondary data is available whilst con-
tent data is unavailable due to either encryption or limits prescribed by certain
interception warrants. Secondary data even without content data has proven
to be extremely useful in tracing contacts, associations and habits (Anderson,
2016). Our model assumes at a minimum some availability of secondary data.
3.3 The network
Before we describe how the latent levels of collaboration given by conspiratorial
links can be estimated, it is useful to construct a network of the individuals in Ωt.
The possible links between individuals can be described through an undirected
weighted network Nt at time t. Define the graph of Nt as follows
Nt = (V (Nt), E(Nt))
where V (Nt) = Ωt is the set of nodes and E(Nt) are the edges of the network.
An edge exists between two individuals ωi and ωj if:
1. At some point in the past the pair enjoyed significant ties, such as being
in the same extended family, being close friends, being arrested, stopped
and searched, or imprisoned together.
2. Since both becoming POIs they have been observed communicating; such
information may be gained through direct surveillance and monitoring, or
intelligence gained through secondary sources.
These edges correspond to the pairs of individuals whose communications
the authorities observe. Suppose that an edge exists between ωi and ωj . The
weight on this edge will be given by the conspiratorial link φijt contained in the
symmetric conspiracy matrix Φt. Observe that unlike most weighted networks in
the literature, the edge weights here are distributions instead of point estimates.
Example 1. Three individuals ω1, ω2, ω3 have been seen to have posted pro-
terrorist material on social media and have been triaged into Ωt the observed
population at time t: they are being investigated and their communications are
being monitored. Further investigation reveals that ω1 and ω2 attended the same
secondary school and are the same age, and that ω2 and ω3 attend the same
gym and are frequently seen together. Due to these pre-existing links, the model
forms edges between their representative nodes at time t, see Figure 3a. At time
t+ 1 a separate lead reveals the return of an individual ω4 from Syria who was
known to also have pro-terrorist ideas. It is suspected that he went to Syria for
terrorist training. This information is represented in Figure 3b. At time t+ 2 it
is discovered that mobile phones newly registered to the addresses of ω1 and ω4
are in communication. This creates a tie between ω1 and ω4 as shown in Figure
3c and over the next few weeks the communications and activities of the four
individuals are monitored.
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ω1,t
ω2,t
ω3,t
(a)
ω1,t+1
ω2,t+1
ω3,t+1
ω4,t+1
(b)
ω1,t+2
ω2,t+2 ω4,t+2
ω3,t+2
(c)
Figure 3: Structure of subnetwork at times t, t+ 1 and t+ 2
3.4 Setting up the model
Next we consider the task of estimating the weights on the edges of each net-
work Nt, t ≥ 0. The latent levels of collaboration specified by Φt are estimated
using the observable data in Ut. Let Ft− denote all the past information up to
time t. Ft− includes {PΦs}0≤s<t and {Us}0≤s<t, where PΦs is the distribution
of Φs. With the help of the following simplifying assumptions, Φt can be easily
estimated from Ut and Φt−1 for each time t using the steady model described
in Section 3.5; thus allowing for fast real-time updates. Here ⊥⊥ indicates prob-
abilistic independence.
• Assumption 1: (Pairwise link independence) The conspiratorial links for
each pair {wi, wj} are mutually independent at time t given the past.
⊥⊥{wi,wj}∈Ωt×Ωt φijt | Ft− .
• Assumption 2: (First-order Markov property) φijt ∈ Φt is linked to the
past only through φij,t−1 ∈ Φt−1.
φijt⊥⊥Ft− |φij,t−1.
• Assumption 3: (Output independence) The observations uijt for a pair
{ωi, ωj} at time t are only dependent on the latent conspiratorial link
between them φijt.
uijt⊥⊥(Φt, Ut,Ft−) |φijt.
• Assumption 4: (Information independence) The intelligence from the
various information channels for a {ωi, ωj} at time t are mutually inde-
pendent.
⊥⊥k∈{1,...,m} sijkt
Although some of these assumptions may not hold in reality they are useful
for our initial model and the necessity for relaxation will be evaluated as work
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progresses. For any application using our model, statistical diagnostics must
always be run to measure the extent of the validity of these assumptions. This
is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and henceforth we take these as-
sumptions to be valid. The relationship between the observation and conspiracy
matrices can then be represented as a two time-slice dynamic Bayesian network
(2TS-DBN) whose graph is shown in Figure 4.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Graphical representation of the 2TS-DBN: (a) on a univariate level; (b) on a
multivariate level (labelled as graph G).
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions described above, the marginal likelihood
of the 2TS-DBN represented by the graph G decomposes into the product of the
one step ahead forecasts. Additionally all elements of Ut and Φt can be updated
independently.
The proof can be found in Appendix A of the supplementary materials.
3.5 The steady model
Under non-Gaussian settings the derived one step ahead recurrences needed
to update distributions of Φt in our network are often not in closed form. In
such cases sampling or approximation would be required. Although sequential
approximations such as those used in variational inference have some attraction,
in our context, approximate methods would generally be prohibitive in terms of
the computational demand. However, by an appropriate choice of the state space
representation we can retrieve exact formulae for the one step ahead predictive
distributions.
In this paper, we adopt the approach of using a steady model from Gaussion
dynamic linear models (West and Harrison, 1997). In a general sense, the steady
model manipulates the posterior at time t− 1 into a prior for time t such that
the mean is kept steady with a more diffuse variance. Here, we adapt the
steady model into a non-Gaussian conjugate Gamma-Poisson setting (Smith,
1979, 1981; Smith and Freeman, 2010). Interestingly, a different non-Gaussian
variation of this model has also been applied to modelling online traffic flow
count data in (Chen et al., 2018). Below we outline our Gamma-Poisson steady
model to estimate Φt.
From the setup of the multivariate 2TS-DBN in Section 3.4, we can model
the conspiratorial link φijt using observational data uijt for each pair {ωi, ωj}
independently.
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Initialisation: For each pair {ωi, ωj}, set the prior φij,t0 as follows
φij,t0 ∼ Gamma(αij,t0 , βij,t0) (3)
where t0 is the first time period in our time-series. The parameters αij,t0 and
βij,t0 are determined by existing case knowledge. For example, if e(ωi, ωj) ∈
E(Nt0) exists only due to a social relation αij,t0 and βij,t0 may be set such that
the mean and variance of φij,t0 are both relatively low. Whereas if ωi and ωj
have a previous joint conviction then these parameters can be set such that the
φij,t0 has a high mean and lower variance.
Posterior at time t− 1: Let the posterior of φij,t−1 after observing uij,t−1
and Ft−1− be given by
φij,t−1|uij,t−1,Ft−1− ∼ Gamma(αij,t−1, βij,t−1) (4)
Prior at time t: Under the steady model, we use a discount factor δijt ∈
(0, 1) to evolve the posterior at time t− 1 to the prior at time t as follows.
φijt|Ft− ∼ Gamma(δijtαij,t−1, δijtβij,t−1). (5)
The discount factor δijt represents the decay of information from time t − 1
to time t. Scaling the parameters by δijt gives us the steady evolution in our
model.
Information generation at time t: Recall that from the information
independence assumption in Section 3.4, the observations from the different
information channels can be modelled independently. We assume that the ob-
servations from the information channels are generating through the following
distribution
sijkt|φijt,Ft− ∼ Poisson(ξkφijt), k = 1, . . . ,m. (6)
Posterior at time t: Then the posterior when the observation vector uijt
has at least one non-zero element is given by
p(φijt|uijt,Ft−) ∝
m∏
k=1
p(sijkt|φijt,Ft−) p(φijt|Ft−)
φijt|uijt,Ft− ∼ Gamma(αijt, βijt) (7)
where αijt = δijtαij,t−1 +
∑
k sijkt and βijt = δijtβij,t−1 +
∑
k ξk.
One step ahead forecast: The one step ahead forecast of the information
from channel k can be obtained in closed form as
p(sijk,t+1|Ft+1−) =
∫
φij,t+1
p(sijk,t+1|φij,t+1,Ft+1−) p(φij,t+1|Ft+1−) dφij,t+1
=
(
sijk,t+1 + δij,t+1αijt − 1
sijk,t+1
)
(δij,t+1βijt)
δij,t+1αijt ξ
sijk,t+1
k
(ξk + δij,t+1βijt)(δij,t+1αijt+sijk,t+1)
.
(8)
In settings such as ours, it is essential to differentiate between the following
cases:
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1.
∑
k sijkt = 0 because ωi and ωj were monitored but did not communicate
in any way during time t;
2.
∑
k sijkt = 0 because ωi and ωj were not closely monitored during time t.
In the first case, the posterior update is carried out as described above. In
the second case, the prior at time t is set as the posterior at time t, i.e. a
posterior update using the data is not carried out. This ensures that when we
haven’t actually observed zero communications, the posterior mean at time t is
the same as the posterior mean at time t−1 and the posterior variance increases
from time t− 1 to t.
The distribution of the latent level of collaboration can hence be periodically
updated in closed form using the above recurrences across the network given the
sequential incoming observational data. Also, the dynamic nature of the open
population is easily incorporated in our model by introducing vertices, edges and
priors for immigrants (new entrants) and removing them for emigrants (leavers)
at the appropriate time.
4 Integrating system and cell-level threat mea-
sure
Having presented the criminal collaboration model we now integrate this with
the individual RVE models (see Section 2). The RVE model is used for individ-
uals belonging to Ωt at time t. This combination forms the basis of an integrated
decision support system (IDSS) for the counter-terrorism authorities. We then
show that estimation and inference for the criminal collaboration model and the
individual RVEs can be performed independently even under the IDSS by as-
suming certain conditional independences across the process. Finally, we utilise
the independent estimation of parameters across the IDSS to arrive at a measure
of imminence of threat posed by a known or suspected group of collaborating
individuals within Ωt.
It is appropriate here to technically define what we mean by a cell in this
model. We define here a cell C as a possibly strict subset of a connected compo-
nent X of the collaboration network C ⊆ X ⊆ Nt that the investigators, based
on their expert judgement, determine to be an organisational unit for potential
attack. Recall that the network connections are formed either by existing ties
known by the investigators or observed communications post entry into Ω. More
sophisticated methods for identifying clusters exist in network theory and there
are various definitions of what constitutes a terrorist cell in terrorism research
(Shapiro, 2005). However for our purposes we take this simple definition. More
nuanced definitions of cells, and more sophisticated methods of identifying them
will be addressed in future work.
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4.1 Integrated decision support system
The success of any attempts to carry out a group attack is not only informed by
the latent levels of collaboration between pairs of individuals within a criminal
cell but also by the threat posed by each member of such a cell. Thus in order
to analyse any network of criminal collaborations among a population Ωt of
suspected criminals, the model must also be linked to the individual RVEs of
each member ω ∈ Ωt.
Define the following
Θt = {θωt : ω ∈ Ωt}
Z t = {Zωt : ω ∈ Ωt}
W t = {Wωt : ω ∈ Ωt}
where θωt,Zωt and Wωt are defined as in Section 2 for the RVE of ω ∈ Ωt.
The communications observed between a pair {ωi, ωj} given by uijt is closely
linked to the data on these individuals given by Y ωit and Y ωjt. This relates uijt
to the task intensitiesZωit andZωjt for ωi and ωj ’s individual RVEs respectively.
Thus from the observation matrix Ut, we can construct a vector ut = {uωt :
ω ∈ Ωt} where uωt is a function of Ut reflecting the totality of information
exchanges between ω and those they6 are in contact with. Using this link, we
can combine the two types of models into an integrated decision support system
(Leonelli and Smith, 2015). We first set out the assumptions where F∗t− is all
the past information up to time t contained in the individual RVEs and the
criminal collaboration model.
• Assumption 1: (Mutual independence given task intensity) The individ-
ual RVE models are mutually independent given task intensities.
(Wωit, θωit)⊥⊥(Wωjt, θωjt)|Z t
• Assumption 2: (Initial prior threat independence) The prior parameters
of the RVE models and the collaboration model are independent
(W0,Θ0)⊥⊥Φ0.
• Assumption 3: (Threat states are Markov) The threat states are linked
to the past F∗t− only through the latest threat states.
(Wt,Θt)⊥⊥F∗t− |(Wt−1,Θt−1).
• Assumption 4: (Conditional instantaneous independence) The current
task intensities are independent of the past given the current task set and
the current total communications of each individual.
Z t⊥⊥F∗t− |Θt,ut.
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Figure 5: Graph of the IDSS.
With these assumptions, the IDSS can be represented by the graph in Figure
5.
Theorem 2. The collaboration model and the individual RVEs in the IDSS
model developed under the above assumptions can be decoupled.
See the proof using the d-separation theorem in Appendix B of the supple-
mentary material.
4.2 Cell-level threat measure
Here we demonstrate how through a simple yet effective combination of factors
we can quantify the imminence of the threat posed by cells. The threat measure
can be plotted against time to analyse how the threat posed by the cell develops
dynamically. Theorem 2 enables us to combine the outputs from the criminal
collaboration model (Section 3) with the individual RVE models (Section 2) to
arrive at a holistic threat measure.
The resources available to the authorities are limited and so it is critical
that they are able to identify which cell poses the most imminent threat. To
enable quick real-time support, we need a measure that can be readily calculated
from the available information and easily interpreted by the authorities. As a
basic requirement, we need that the subgraph of Nt induced by the members
of a suspected cell C is connected. To carry out a collaborative attack, each
individual in C needs to be in contact with at least one other individual in C,
otherwise a joint effort would not be possible. We now present a threat measure
for a suspected terrorist cell C considering the following factors described below.
(1) Collective progress: The development of the plot being pursued col-
lectively by the cell can be indicated by a latent threat stateWCt ∈ {wC0 , . . . , wCk }.
Similar to Section 2, the available data Y Ct can be used to inform the status of
completion of a set of hidden tasks θCt associated with the plot through a signal
of task intensities ZCt . A probability vector pi
C
t = {piC1t, . . . , piCkt}, indicating the
probability of being in the k threat states at time t, can be obtained through
6We use “they” and “their” as indefinite gender singular pronouns
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the recurrence in Equations 1-2. However, in such a collaborative unit, there
will be some tasks that need only be done by a subset of members of the cell; for
example figuring out the logistics or developing certain skills. Thus, the signal
ZCt obtained from the collective data on the cell Y
C
t must be set against these
requirements to indicate whether the tasks are being sufficiently completed. Let
T C ⊂WCt indicate the set of threat states considered to be most dangerous by
the authorities. As an example we can set T C = {Preparing, Mobilised}. A
measure of preparedness of the cell can be obtained as
m1 =
∑
wCi ∈TC
piit. (9)
(2) Individual threat: Recall that the individual RVE represents the
progress made by an individual on a plot they plan to enact themselves. By
considering the the same plot being pursued by the cell for the individual RVEs
of the members, we are likely to underestimate the threat of each member. This
happens as the cell needs to collectively have the capability to enact the plot and
each individual need not be part of every task associated with the plot. Ideally
we would be able to identify with each member of C the role that they play
within the cell. Each role can then have an associated set of tasks. However,
this is not always possible as it requires detailed understanding of the cell’s
dynamics.
One option is to evaluate the threat status of the individuals in C based
on their progress on the tasks θ∗t ⊂ θCt that most of the members of C are
expected to have the skills to do. The threat states for the individual RVEs can
be adapted in line with this to obtain the sum of measures of individual threat
for each member of C as
m2 =
∏
ω∈C
{∑
wi∈T
piωit
}
(10)
where T denotes the set of most dangerous threat states in the individual RVEs.
(3) Latent collaboration: In any cell, we may not expect each pair to be
communicating with each other but for any successful collaborative project, a
certain amount of connectivity is expected between each communicating pair
and overall in the cell. Hence we set up two different measures of cohesion. For
each communicating pair {ωi, ωj} in C, we measure pairwise cohesion as
m∗3 = p(φijt > x1) (11)
where x1 is the lower limit of how much we expect each pair to be communicating
for the plot to be enacted. A cell-wide measure of pairwise cohesion can be
obtained as
m3 =
∏
{ωi,ωj}∈Ωt×Ωt
p(φijt > x1). (12)
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Similarly, a cell-level cohesion measure can be obtained from the subnetwork
density of C
m4 =
k(
n
2
) (13)
where k = |E(Ct)| is the number of ties of the subnetwork representing the cell
C ∈ Nt at time t, n = |Ct| is the size of the cell C and thus
(
n
2
)
is the number
of possible ties in C.
(4) Size of the cell: While collaborative efforts benefit from sharing re-
sources and skills, a very large cell can be unwieldy and increases the risk of
exposure of the cell. For a given plot, the authorities are likely to be able to
estimate an ideal cell size n∗. A simple measure of cell integrity is obtained as
m5 = sech(
n− n∗
n∗
) (14)
Cell threat score: For a given plot, a cell is most threatening when m1 =
m2 = m3 = m4 = m5 = 1. We can obtain an ordered set of cell based threat
scores {ϕC(i)}, i ∈ {0, .., 4} as
ϕC(i) =
5−i∏
j=1
m
′
j (15)
{m′j}j=1,..,5 = σ({mi}i=1,..5)
where σ is a reordering of elements from high to low so that for i = 1 . . . 4
0 ≤ m′i+1 ≤ m′i ≤ 1
and hence for i = 0 . . . 3
0 ≤ ϕC(i) ≤ ϕC(i+ 1) ≤ 1
This ordered set is used to check whether a single or few measures’ values are
overly affecting the base ϕC(0) score. Each of these scores has the property that
a higher value of ϕC(i) indicates a greater imminence and danger of the threat
posed by the cell C. Thus we have combined several key factors to obtain a
transparent threat score for a cell which can guide the authorities to prioritise
and de-prioritise cases. Note that this score can be easily adapted to incorporate
other elements that may be considered to be essential by the policing authorities.
5 Simulation
In this penultimate section we develop Example 1 from Section 3.3 with a syn-
thetic data scenario. The actual observational and communications data avail-
able to the policing authorities are classified. The synthetic data we use is
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based on meetings with authorities and public source data on a variety of ac-
tual cases. We illustrate the dynamics of the collaboration model, the extension
of the individual RVE model to a cell based RVE model, and the coupling of the
criminal collaboration model with the RVE model to produce cell level threat
measures. We keep the network small both as this is realistic to several ter-
rorist incidents and in order to maintain clarity of exposition. Since the model
equations throughout are in closed form the model scales to larger networks.
5.1 Scenario
Recall from example 1 that three individuals ω1, ω2, and ω3 have been triaged
into Ωt based on their pro-terrorist social media posting and a fourth ω4 based
on their suspected terrorist training in Syria. They are all known to live in
the North East area of the same city. Ties between the first three have been
created due to existing school and gym affiliations, and a tie between ω4 and
ω1 has been created based on mobile phone communication. Based on this
information prior probabilities of their individual threat positions in the RVE
model are set as depicted in Figure 6. Since ω4 is known to have returned
from Syria and believed to have trained there, their probability of being in the
Training position is high; whilst for the others their stated views indicates high
probability of being in the ActiveConvert position.
ActiveConvert 0.6
Training 0.2
0.4
Preparing 0.1
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.05
0.9990.999
(a) RDCEG for ω1, ω2, ω3; node
labels are prior position proba-
bilities; edge labels are position
transition probabilities i.e. ele-
ments mi,j of matrix M
0 in Ta-
ble 1.
ActiveConvert 0.2
Training 0.6
0.4
Preparing 0.1
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.05
0.9990.999
(b) RDCEG for ω4: Note due to
prior information the probability
of ω4 being in training is higher
than for the other individuals.
Figure 6: Reduced Dynamic Chain Event Graph for individuals with prior position and edge
probabilities
As these four individuals are in the set Ωt their activities and communica-
19
tions are being monitored. Over the next weeks ω1’s internet activity includes
repeated visits to car dealer and car rental websites, and to knife retailers. Data
from their bank account shows a large increase in funds from an overseas bank
transfer. ω2’s internet activity includes visits to illegal bomb making websites
and to extremist radical websites. ω4’s internet activity includes online map
searches of government buildings and densely populated commercial areas of
the city. They physically visit potential bomb testing sites. The observed ac-
tivity data for each individual are shown in Figure 7. This data is used in the
RVE model.
(a) ω1 observed activity data (b) ω2 observed activity data
(c) ω3 observed activity data (d) ω4 observed activity data
Figure 7: Activity data for the individuals in the cell over the observed time period
We move on to the communications data for the collaboration model which
is observed over the same time period as the activity data. For simplicity in
this example we suppose observations of the communications between these
individuals comes from a single channel: mobile phone calls. Table 2 shows
the sum of the calls in hours observed between each pair over a period of ten
weeks t1 to t10. Figure 8 charts this data. From week 2 to week 4 the pair
(ω1, ω2) who attended the same secondary school talk over their mobile phones
at a consistent rate. In week 3 ω1 calls ω4 the returnee from Syria. In week 5 ω1
converses with ω3 and ω2 converses with ω4. These new calls create new ties in
the network. By week 6 all four individuals are mutually communicating7 and
the total times of these calls increase from weeks 7 to 10.
5.2 Collaboration model application
Using the Gamma-Poisson steady model described in Section 3.5, we specify
the prior distribution of latent criminal collaboration by means of setting the α
and β parameters for each pair with known ties. As discussed this is based on
7Thus technically the subgraph of the cell is now a complete graph.
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any information known at that time about the pair. The communications data
then updates the posterior for each pairs’ latent criminal collaboration at each
week.
s1,2 s1,3 s1,4 s2,3 s2,4 s3,4
t1 0 0 0 0 0 0
t2 3 0 0 1 0 0
t3 5 0 2 0 0 0
t4 5 0 5 0 0 0
t5 5 5 5 0 2 0
t6 5 6 6 5 6 5
t7 7 6 7 6 7 7
t8 6 6 8 4 8 8
t9 7 7 9 7 9 9
t10 7 8 11 8 10 10
Table 2: Simulated weekly mobile phone call data of pairs of individuals in collaboration
network
Figure 8: Histogram of mobile phone data
The resulting α and β parameters from the Gamma-Poisson steady network
model are shown in Table 5 and the means and standard deviations are shown in
Table 6 both in Appendix C of the supplementary material Bunnin et al. (2020).
The evolution of the latent collaboration distributions through time are shown
in Figure 11 and the evolution of the individual threat position probabilities are
shown in Figures 9. The final posterior position probabilities at time t10 for
each individual’s RDCEG from the RVE model are shown in Figure 10.
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(a) Position probabilities through
time for ω1
(b) Position probabilities through
time for ω2
(c) Position probabilities through
time for ω3
(d) Position probabilities through
time for ω4
Figure 9: Posterior probabilities through time from the RVE model for individuals
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ActiveConvert 0.0042
Training 0.2189
0.4
Preparing 0.6457
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.1311
0.9990.999
(a) RDCEG for ω1
ActiveConvert 0.0001
Training 0.0459
0.4
Preparing 0.9279
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.0261
0.9990.999
(b) RDCEG for ω2
ActiveConvert 0.2946
Training 0.2175
0.4
Preparing 0.3236
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.1639
0.9990.999
(c) RDCEG for ω3
ActiveConvert 0.0000
Training 0.0000
0.4
Preparing 0.4596
0.599
0.999
Mobilised 0.5404
0.9990.999
(d) RDCEG for ω4
Figure 10: Posterior probabilities from the RVE model for individuals
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(a) posterior density at t3 (b) posterior density at t4
(c) posterior density at t5 (d) posterior density at t6
(e) posterior density at t7 (f) posterior density at t8
(g) posterior density at t9 (h) posterior density at t10
Figure 11: Latent level of criminal collaboration between pairs of individuals in the network
inferred as evolving densities φt using the Gamma-Poisson steady model
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(a) posterior density at t6 (b) prior density at t7
Figure 12: Illustration of increased dispersion for φ densities from t6 posterior to t7 prior
using the Gamma-Poisson steady model. The means and standard deviations of the prior
densities (see Table 6) set at the first time a tie is modelled reflects what the authorities know
about their level of collaboration and the uncertainty associated with it. To obtain the prior
for week tn+1, the discount factor is applied to the parameters of the posterior at time tn.
From the prior densities shown in this figure and from Table 5, we can see that the variance
of the priors for tn+1 increases compared to the variance of the posteriors for the week before
that (tn), while the means are kept stable. This reflects that at the start of every new week,
before any new data is processed, we expect the level of collaboration between each pair to
have remained the same as it was last week but we are less sure of this now.
As the total times of the calls increase the collaboration densities move to the
right (see Figure 11). This indicates higher probabilities of collaboration towards
an attack. The individual RVE models results (see Figure 9) are consistent with
these results. In the next section we illustrate the results from the coupling of
the RVE and collaboration models.
5.3 Cell level RVE model and threat score
As discussed in Section 4.2 we construct a cell based RVE model with the com-
bined task sets and combined observational data on the individuals believed to
be part of the cell. We take the position probabilities of the individual within
the cell with highest prior threat, ω4, as the prior probabilities for the cell level
RDCEG. We then calculate joint task intensities based on the data from all the
individuals in the network. From the task intensities the cell position probabil-
ities are progagated as in the individual RVE model; i.e. using Equations 1 and
2. The prior and posterior network and RDCEG for the cell is shown in Figure
13 and the evolution through time in Figure 14. As can be seen the threat state
probability for the position Preparing increases from week 5 as activity and
communications increase, and in weeks 9 and 10 the probability for the cell to
in position Mobilised sharply increases. The numeric cell threat measures m1
to m5 and the combined scores ϕC are shown in Table 3. If we signal a warning
when ϕC reaches a certain threshold, say 0.15 then we can see that for ϕC(0)
this is not reached till time t7 whereas for ϕC(2) this is reached by time t3.
In practise we would expect the investigators to calibrate such measures and
thresholds using experience and judgement, and thus this is work in progress.
To summarise, this worked example demonstrates how observed activity
data and communications data combined with prior distributions calibrated to
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investigator’s knowledge can give real-time measures of dynamic threat at the
cell and individual levels. The strengths of latent criminal collaboration and
the latent threat state probabilities are estimated dynamically based on the
incoming data.
In this particular scenario, with synthetic data informed by real cases, the
results show a marked increase in threat levels driven by the increase in specific
activity data and mobile phone call times. This is shown in by large increases
in the Preparing probability for the cell at times t5 and t6 and then increases
at times t9 and t10 for the Mobilised probability. In terms of cell threat score
this is reflected in the increase in ϕC(2) from 0.27 at time t4 to 0.57 at time t6
and then reaching 0.88/0.89 for time t7 to t10.
We have thus demonstrated how the collaboration model works using syn-
thetic data and how it is coupled with the RVE model to produce cell level threat
state probabilities and scores. The concluding section reviews the research and
discusses future work.
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ActiveConvert 0.20
Training 0.60
0.4
Preparing 0.10
0.59
0.99
Mobilised 0.05
0.990.99
(a) RDCEG for cell with prior
position probabilities
ActiveConvert 0.00
Training 0.00
0.4
Preparing 0.39
0.59
0.99
Mobilised 0.61
0.990.99
(b) RDCEG for cell with time
t10 posterior position probabili-
ties
ω1
ω2
ω3
ω4
(c) Collaboration network at
time t1. Node colour indicates
individual’s position of highest
probability.
ω1 ω4
ω2
ω3
(d) Collaboration network at
time t10. Edge width and colour
indicates strength of tie.
Figure 13: Graphical depictions of the prior and posterior threat status of the terrorist cell
using the integrated RVE and criminal collaboration models
27
Prior t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
m1 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.45 0.71 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
m2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.22 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.36
m3 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
m4 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
m5 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
ϕC(0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21
ϕC(1) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
ϕC(2) 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.42 0.57 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89
ϕC(3) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.86 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
ϕC(4) 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 3: Cell level measures of threat resulting from integration of RVE and collaboration
models. m1 to m5 give individual measures of aspects of cell preparedness and cohesion. The
various ϕC(j) combine the mi measures to give an overall score of cell threat. The argument
to ϕC is the number of measures mi omitted from the product, in order of smallest to largest
i.e. ϕC(1) omits min{mi}i=1..5.
Figure 14: Visual display of cell level RVE model position probabilities through time based on
combined individual activity data and assuming a joint task set shared between cell members.
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6 Discussion
In this paper we have demonstrated how using various types of noisy and sparse
data to which authorities typically have access, a criminal collaboration model
can be developed to track, analyse and predict the collective activities of indi-
viduals acting in concert. We showed how this model can be combined with
the individual RVE models presented in Bunnin and Smith (2019) to create an
integrated decision support system. This support system produced both indi-
vidual level and cell based measures of dynamic progress towards attack. The
methods used in this paper are novel to this application and provide a way of
setting the literature on social network models applied to this domain within a
more flexible and statistically defensible framework for further exploration.
Within this domain uncertainty and hidden or false signals are key chal-
lenges. We have attempted to build our model in such a way that combinations
of weak signals can be extracted and utilised given the preexisting knowledge
of the investigators. Moreover the model can be modified or overriden at any
point by manually changing parameters or creating or deleting ties as the in-
vestigators see fit. The working of the model are transparent relying purely on
Bayesian updating and prior distribution inputs. Thus all results can be traced
back to the data and the quantitative assumptions.
Going forward, there are several ways in which our models can be refined and
extended. Preliminary explorations show that conventional clustering methods
appear to have unsatisfactory performance in identifying potential cells directly
from the dynamic network data. Moreover the noted characteristics of incom-
pleteness and fuzzy boundaries need to be addressed in any algorithmic or sta-
tistical attempts to identify cell members.
Future work includes constructing methods to infer non-observed individu-
als from observational data and from domain knowledge on the organisational
structure of cells. We are now starting to develop various stochastic set func-
tions which can be used within a bespoke clustering framework for applications
similar to our own. The early results of this work are promising and will be
reported as a follow up to this paper. Also, while it would be of great practical
importance to effectively identify weak ties as described by Sparrow (1991), it
is difficult to distinguish these from benign low levels of communication and
contact. Incorporating this with consideration of the dynamic network data
{Ns}s≤t would be a useful line of future work.
Finally the generic architecture we construct might be applicable in other
domains where there is a requirement to integrate individual time series with
dynamic interactions where the individuals have a collaborative objective. Ex-
ample are other social processes such as the development of different political
pressure groups. In summary we provide a novel example of how to set about
building a integrated decision support systems where the modelled social process
involves complex interacting agents with shared goals.
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A Proof of Theorem 1.
Denote by p(φijt | F−t ) the prior distributions for φijt given the past information
up to time t−1. Using the pairwise link independence assumption, φijt for each
pair {ωi, ωj} ∈ Ωt × Ωt can be set independently. This allows us to write prior
density of Φt as
p(Φt | F−t ) =
∏
{ωi,ωj}∈Ωt×Ωt
p(φijt | F−t ). (16)
With the first-order Markovianity and the output independence assump-
tions, the matrix Ut and the posterior of Φt decompose as follow
p(Ut | F−t ) =
∏
{ωi,ωj}∈Ωt×Ωt
p(uijt | F−t ). (17)
p(Φt |Ut,F−t ) =
∏
{ωi,ωj}∈Ωt×Ωt
p(φijt |uijt,F−t ). (18)
For each pair {ωi, ωj}, on observing a vector uijt of information from the
various channels and with the information independence assumption, φijt can
be updated as
p(φijt |uijt,F−t ) ∝ p(φijt | F−t )p(uijt |φijt,F−t )
=
m∏
k=1
p(φijt | F−t )p(sijkt |φijt,F−t ). (19)
Thus the one step ahead forecasts can be written as
p(uijt | F−t ) =
∫
φijt
p(uijt |φijt,F−t )p(φijt | F−t ) dφijt
=
m∏
k=1
∫
φijt
p(sijkt |φijt,F−t )p(φijt | F−t ) dφijt (20)
Now the marginal likelihood of the first-order Markov model described by
the graph G can be decomposed into a product of the one step ahead forecasts
as follows:
p(U1, . . . , Ut | F−1 ) =
t∏
s=1
p(Us | F−s )
=
t∏
s=1
∏
{ωi,ωj}∈Ωs×Ωs
m∏
k=1
∫
φijs
p(sijks |φijs,F−s )p(φijs | F−s ) dφijs
(21)
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or equivalently as a sum of the log marginal likelihoods as
log(p(U1, . . . , Ut | F−1 )) =
t∑
s=1
∑
{ωi,ωj}∈Ωs×Ωs
m∑
k=1
log p(sijks | F−s ) (22)
where F−1 reflects the initial information fed into the model at time t0.
B Proof of Theorem 2.
Here we use the d-separation theorem for Bayesian Networks (Cowell et al.,
2001; Pearl, 1988) as it applies to dynamic settings (Korb and Nicholson, 2010).
Similar to the graphs in Figure 4, the graph of the IDSS can also be thought of
a 2TS-DBN. The moralised version of the 2TS-DBN (IDSS) graph in Figure 5
is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Moralised graph of the 2TS-DBN in Figure 5.
From the moralised graph, we can see that all the paths between (W t,Θt)
and Φt pass through Ut and ut. Note that two variables X and Y are condi-
tionally independent given a set of conditioning variables Z if there is no path
connecting X and Y after removing the variables in Z from the moralised graph.
Thus the following conditional independence relationships can be identified from
the moralised graph in Figure 15.
(W t,Θt)⊥⊥Φt |Φt−1, (W t−1,Θt−1), Ut,Z t
and
(W t,Θt)⊥⊥Φt |Φt−1, (W t−1,Θt−1),ut,Z t.
Assume that we have set up priors so that
(W 0,Θ0)⊥⊥Φ0,
and let
F1t , {Us,Z s}0<s≤t, F2t , {Us}0<s≤t, F3t , {us,Z s}0<s≤t.
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Now iterating forwards on the first of these equations using the semi-graphoid
axioms and using the fact that observations are independent of all variables
given the current realisations of its parents we obtain that for all times t that
(W t,Θt)⊥⊥Φt | F1t .
This means that given the full histories of the individuals, the states associ-
ated with the individual RVEs and the states associated with the collaboration
network model remain independent.
Secondly, we note from unrolling the moralised graph and using the d-
separation theorem that
Φt⊥⊥
(
(W t,Θt), {Z s}0<s≤t
)
| F2t
which, in particular, implies that the past data {Z s}0<s≤t has no effect on dis-
tributions of Φt|F2t . This means that the network model can be fully updated
without having to consider {Z s}0<s≤t conditional on observing {Us}0<s≤t. In
fact there is an even stronger relationship here. If we assume that whenever
we observe {Z s}0<s≤t for a particular ω ∈ Ωt we also see the much smaller
collection of measurements {us}0<s≤t this modularity also holds because it rep-
resents an ancestral sample (see Smith (2010)). This will almost inevitably hold
because if we observe ω’s communications we also in particular observe commu-
nications with ω’s neighbours in Ωt which will be what is measured through the
extent {us}0<s≤t path in the vector process {us}0<s≤t.
Thirdly, again by iterating these equations forward, we have that
(W t,Θt)⊥⊥Φt | F3t .
By conditioning on the sequence {us}0<s≤t the formulae for the update of
p(Θt|F3t−1) are simple closed form expressions: a straightforward generalisa-
tion of those given in Bunnin and Smith (2019). This means that we can obtain
means and the covariance matrices moving forward in time of the threat posed
by the whole group again in closed form: see Queen and Smith (1993).
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C Tables of RVE and CC model variables
States Tasks Observables
Neutral EngageWithRadicalisers RadWebVisits
ActiveConvert EngageInPublicThreats PhysicalMeetsWithRadicals
Training MakePersonalThreats E-MeetsWithradicals
Preparing AttendanceAtRadicalEventsPublic RadicalStatementsPublic
Mobilised ReducePublicEngagementsInRadicalisation RadicalStatementsPrivate
ReduceContactWithFamilyFriends MeetTrainedRadicals
Obtain Financial Resources MeetCellMembers
Travel to training camp SeenAtRadicalDemonstrations
ReconnoitreTargets ReductionInSightingsAtRadicalDemos
MoveToTargetToAttack ReductionContactsWithNonRadicals
Learn to drive PublicThreatsMade
Obtain vehicle PersonalThreatMade
Learn how to construct bomb SellAssets
Purchase bomb making materials IncreaseInFinances
Constuct bomb DecreaseInFinances
TestBomb E-VisitsToTargetLocations
Plant bomb VisitsToTargetLocations
Learn how to use gun LegacyStatements
Convert legal device to gun StatementOfIntent
Acquire Gun GeneralCarWebSearches
Acquire Ammunition ObtainLicence
Acquire knife Driving lessons
Purchase car
Rent car
CarDealerWebHits
CarDealerPhysicalVisits
E-messages about cars
LargeExpenditure
BombMakingWebSiteHits
BombManualsBought
TechnicalElectro/ChemicalWebsiteHits
TechnicalElectro/ChemicalManualsBought
VisitsToPotentialTestingSites
Purchase of flight tickets to training countries
GunWebSearches
ShootingTrainingCourses
VisitsToGunShops
VisitsToShootingRanges
Purchase of convertible device eg CS gas pisto...
Medium to large expenditure
Stolen gun known in location
Contacts with gun and ammunition dealers
KnifeWebSearches
SeenBuyingKnives
SeenwithKnife
Table 4: Example state space, task vector and observable data
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φ1,2 φ1,3 φ1,4 φ2,3 φ2,4 φ3,4
α β α β α β α β α β α β
t0 1 2 1 2
t1prior 0.70 1.41 0.70 1.41
t1post 0.70 2.41 0.70 2.41
t2prior 0.50 1.70 0.50 1.70
t2post 3.50 2.70 1.50 2.70
t3prior 2.46 1.90 1.05 1.90
t3post 7.46 2.90 2 1 1.05 2.90
t4prior 5.26 2.04 1.41 0.70 0.74 2.04
t4post 10.26 3.04 6.41 1.70 0.74 3.04
t5prior 7.23 2.15 4.52 1.20 0.52 2.15
t5post 12.23 3.15 2 1 9.52 2.20 0.52 3.15 1 1
t6prior 8.62 2.22 1.41 0.70 6.71 1.55 0.37 2.22 0.70 0.70
t6post 13.62 3.22 7.41 1.70 12.71 2.55 5.37 3.22 6.70 1.70 1 1
t7prior 9.60 2.27 5.22 1.20 8.95 1.80 3.78 2.27 4.72 1.20 0.70 0.70
t7post 16.60 3.27 11.22 2.20 15.95 2.80 9.78 3.27 11.72 2.20 7.70 1.70
t8prior 11.70 2.30 7.91 1.55 11.24 1.97 6.89 2.30 8.26 1.55 5.43 1.20
t8post 17.70 3.30 13.91 2.55 19.24 2.97 10.89 3.30 16.26 2.55 13.43 2.20
t9prior 12.47 2.33 9.80 1.80 13.56 2.09 7.68 2.33 11.46 1.80 9.46 1.55
t9post 19.47 3.33 16.80 2.80 22.56 3.09 14.68 3.33 20.46 2.80 18.46 2.55
t10prior 13.72 2.34 11.84 1.97 15.90 2.18 10.34 2.34 14.42 1.97 13.01 1.80
t10post 20.72 3.34 19.84 2.97 26.90 3.18 18.34 3.34 24.42 2.97 23.01 2.80
t11prior 14.60 2.36 13.98 2.09 18.95 2.24 12.93 2.36 17.21 2.09 16.22 1.97
Table 5: α, and β parameters through time for φ1,2,t, φ1,3,t, φ1,4,t, φ2,3,t, φ2,4,t, and φ3,4,t.
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φ1,2 φ1,3 φ1,4 φ2,3 φ2,4 φ3,4
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
t0 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
t1prior 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.60
t1post 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35
t2prior 0.29 0.42 0.29 0.42
t2post 1.30 0.69 0.55 0.45
t3prior 1.30 0.83 0.55 0.54
t3post 2.57 0.94 2 1.41 0.36 0.35
t4prior 2.57 1.12 2 1.68 0.36 0.42
t4post 3.37 1.05 3.76 1.49 0.24 0.28
t5prior 3.37 1.25 3.76 1.77 0.24 0.34
t5post 3.89 1.11 2 1.41 4.32 1.40 0.17 0.23 1 1
t6prior 3.89 1.32 2 1.68 4.32 1.67 0.17 0.27 1 1.19
t6post 4.23 1.15 4.35 1.60 4.98 1.40 1.67 0.72 3.93 1.52 1 1
t7prior 4.23 1.37 4.35 1.90 4.98 1.66 1.67 0.86 3.93 1.81 1 1.19
t7post 5.08 1.25 5.10 1.52 5.70 1.43 2.99 0.96 5.33 1.56 4.52 1.63
t8prior 5.08 1.49 5.10 1.81 5.70 1.70 2.99 1.14 5.33 1.85 4.52 1.94
t8post 5.36 1.27 5.45 1.46 6.48 1.48 3.30 1.00 6.37 1.58 6.10 1.66
t9prior 5.36 1.52 5.45 1.74 6.48 1.76 3.30 1.19 6.37 1.88 6.10 1.98
t9post 5.85 1.33 6.00 1.47 7.29 1.54 4.41 1.15 7.31 1.62 7.24 1.68
t10prior 5.85 1.58 6.00 1.75 7.29 1.83 4.41 1.37 7.31 1.93 7.24 2.01
t10post 6.20 1.36 6.68 1.50 8.46 1.63 5.48 1.28 8.22 1.66 8.22 1.71
t11prior 6.20 1.62 6.68 1.79 8.46 1.94 5.48 1.53 8.22 1.98 8.22 2.04
Table 6: Prior and posterior means, standard deviations (std) through time
φ1,2,t, φ1,3,t, φ1,4,t, φ2,3,t, φ2,4,t, and φ3,4,t.
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